Canadian Military History
Volume 20

Issue 2

Article 2

2011

The Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong: September 1941
Terry Copp
Wilfrid Laurier University, tcopp@wlu.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh

Recommended Citation
Copp, Terry "The Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong: September 1941." Canadian Military History 20, 2
(2011)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more
information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

Copp: Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong

The Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong
September 1941
Terry Copp

O

n 10 September 1941 the British
chiefs of staff, meeting in
London, reversed their long standing
opposition to sending additional
troops to defend Hong Kong. They
authorized the secretary of state
for dominion affairs to invite the
government of Canada to provide a
“small force of one or two battalions”
to reinforce the garrison at Hong
Kong. To understand the British
request and the Canadian reply we
need to review developments in the
Far East as they were understood in
1941.
The dynamic factor was
unquestionably the expansionist
program of the dominant groups in
Japanese society. Since we are not
asking a question about Japanese
imperialism we do not need to examine
its origins or debate its legitimacy. By
1937 the Japanese Empire included
Formosa (1898), Korea (1910) and
Manchuria (1931). After Japan’s
withdrawal from the League of
Nations the military, particularly
the army, “came to dominate
government to the point where it
could effectively veto individual
ministerial appointments.”1 In 1936
Japan joined the Anti-Commintern
Pact aligning itself with Hitler and
Mussolini against the Soviet Union.
The next year, after what is known as
the Marco Polo bridge incident, Japan
began a “special undeclared war” to
gain effective control of China.
Despite long standing American
and European involvement in

Abstract: In November 1941 the
Canadian government, reacting to a
British request, despatched “C” Force
to reinforce the garrison at Hong
Kong. Shortly after the Canadians
arrived, the Japanese army attacked
and captured the British colony.
The entire Canadian contingent of
almost 2,000 men was either killed or
captured in the battle. Recriminations
began immediately as Canadians
tried to understand the reasons
behind the despatch of the force. This
argument was neatly summed up by
Carl Vincent in his book titled, No
Reason Why. Ignoring the simplicity
of hindsight, this article re-examines
the political and strategic situation
of 1941 to better understand the
decision-making process which led to
the despatch of “C” Force. The article
concludes that there were many
reasons why the Canadians were sent
to Hong Kong.

China the western powers were
quite unwilling to intervene and,
by the outbreak of war in Europe,
Japan had conquered northeastern
China and a number of coastal
areas including Canton and the
territory adjacent to Hong Kong.
Neither successful military action nor
systematic terrorism such as the Rape
of Nanking persuaded the president
of China, Chiang Kai-Shek or the
communist leader Mao Tse Tung to
agree to surrender so the undeclared
war against China continued.
From the summer of 1939 to
mid-1941 the Japanese navy pressed
its case for expansion to secure
the resources of southeast Asia,

© Canadian
Military
History,
Volume2011
20, Number 2, Spring 2011, pp.3-13.
Published
by Scholars
Commons
@ Laurier,

especially the oil fields of the Dutch
East Indies. After June 1940, Japan
forced the Vichy government in
France to hand over bases in northern
Indo-China and persuaded the British
to temporarily close the Burma Road,
the Chinese nationalist army’s supply
route. When the Japanese signed the
Tripartite Pact linking their future
with Germany and Italy and a nonaggression pact with the Soviet
Union, the decks were cleared for the
navy’s program of expansion. This at
least was the popular theory in Japan.
The major, perhaps the only,
obstacle was the United States
which had finally begun to react to
Japanese aggression. The occupation
of northern Indo-China was met by a
series of American trade embargoes
including a ban on the export of scrap
iron and aviation fuel to Japan. These
measures had the opposite effect to
the one intended; the decision makers
in Japan were increasingly persuaded
that only war would provide access
to the resources Japan required.
War seemed to be a viable option
because of the military weakness of
Britain and the United States. Japan
could easily win a series of campaigns
in the first months of the war, go
over to the defensive and negotiate a
satisfactory peace, or so the Japanese
military argued.
The apparent success of the
German invasion of Russia prompted
the Japanese Navy to press for
immediate action and in July 1941,
Japan announced a “protectorate”
3
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Churchill and Roosevelt met at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland in August 1941 to
discuss the war. One the topics discussed was how to dissuade the Japanese
from further aggression. Ironically, Churchill was transported to the meeting
aboard the battleship HMS Prince of Wales (below left) which was sunk by the
Japanese along with HMS Repulse only four months later.

over all of Indo-China. The United
States, followed by Britain, the
Dominions and the Netherlands
froze Japanese assets and imposed a
total trade embargo including oil.
The British government sought to
link these initiatives with a warning
to Japan about the consequences of
future expansion. When Churchill
met Roosevelt in August 1941, in the
waters off Newfoundland, he asked
FDR to agree to a joint declaration
warning the Japanese of the
consequences of further expansion,
but strong isolationist sentiment in
the US Congress persuaded Roosevelt
to deal bilaterally with the Japanese.2
American policy in the Pacific
had long been based on the
assumption that war with Japan
could be avoided or postponed by
diplomatic and economic pressure.
This view was underwritten by
the United States Navy which had
continuously reviewed and wargamed conflict with Japan. These
studies demonstrated that, however
successful Japan might be in the early
stages of a war, it could not win a
prolonged conflict with America.
4
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An economy less than one tenth
the size of the United States, Japan
was already fully committed to
war production, could not possibly
compete with the industrial potential
of the US and American planners
believed the Japanese knew this. As
indeed they did.
The US Navy had also concluded
that in the event of war the Philippines
would be lost so there was no point
in sending reinforcements, but in
July 1941 the US Chiefs of Staff
changed their minds. If Japan was
to be deterred instead of defeated
it was necessary to strengthen
American defences and signal the US
commitment to the Philippines. The
recall of General Douglas MacArthur
to active service and his appointment
as commander of US (and Philippine)
forces in the Far East was announced
with great fanfare.3 Reinforcements,
and the ultimate deterrent of the era,
B-17 “Flying Fortress” bombers, were
to be sent to the islands as quickly as
possible.
In Ottawa and other Canadian
cities these events were reported in
front-page stories and debated in

editorials.4 More detailed information
reached External Affairs and National
Defence headquarters through
diplomatic channels. 5 Everything
pointed to a renewed US commitment
to leadership in the Pacific.
The British government was
placed in a very difficult position
by the American refusal to agree to
a clearly phrased warning to Japan.
From the British perspective the US
was forcing Japan to choose between
war and peace while avoiding
responsibility for defending the
most likely victims of war: Thailand,
Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.
But in the summer of 1941 US foreign
policy appeared to be working. The
Japanese prime minister, Prince
Konoye, reorganized his cabinet on
16 July removing the leading proGerman member and replacing him
with a moderate. Prince Konoye
also proposed a direct meeting with
Roosevelt. No such meeting took
place but discussions over a general
settlement began in September when
a new Japanese emissary arrived in
Washington and continued until the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
2
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unhappy with this statement and
replied, “The strategy of the war
insofar as it affected Australian cooperation depended on the presence
of capital ships in Singapore.” 8
Unspecified ships in the Indian Ocean
were of little value to Australia.
With this background we are
able to reconstruct the process of
decision making in September 1941.
Churchill has just returned from
his meeting with Roosevelt which
produced the Atlantic Charter and,
he believed, an agreement to issue
a general warning to Japan against
further expansion. He continued to
stall on the Australian request for a
fleet based in Singapore and rejected
proposals for further reinforcement
of Malaya although he and his
colleagues were well aware that the
Royal Air Force, which was supposed

LAC PA 116456

We must now look more closely
at the British decisions about the
Far East. First, let us remember that
Winston Churchill and his chiefs of
staff were somewhat preoccupied
with other matters in mid-1941. The
German invasion of the Soviet Union
which began on 21 June threatened
the very survival of the Soviet state.
Britain could do little except expedite
the shipment of supplies to Russia,
but this meant aircraft and tanks
needed in other theatres must be
diverted. The Battle of the Atlantic,
and the air offensive over Germany
also required close attention but
above all other issues the War
Cabinet focused on preparations
for Operation “Crusader,” General
Claude Auchinleck’s desert offensive
scheduled for early November 1941.6
The situation in the Far East could
not be entirely ignored especially
because the Australian government
was pressing for action. On 31 August
1941 Churchill sent a “Secret and
Personal” message to the Australian
prime minister noting that “events
about Japan seem to have taken a
more favourable turn in the last
month…I cannot believe that the
Japanese will face the encounter
now developing around them. We
may therefore regard the situation
not only as more favourable but
less tense. Nevertheless,” Churchill
continued,
the growth of our battleship strength,
Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 143359

ravages made upon the German
Navy, which is now reduced apart
from Tirpitz and U-Boats, to very
modest proportions and the measure
we now have taken of the Italian
Navy make it possible in the near
future for us to place heavy ships in
the Indian Ocean…before the end of

to be the key to defence of the colony,
was under-strength and employed
obsolete aircraft. Churchill did not
believe any priority could be given
to what he called “a hypothetical
problem when so many immediate
issues threatened Britain’s survival.”9
The Australians, concerned with their
own survival, did not agree.
It is therefore clear that the
question of sending additional
reinforcements to Hong Kong
would never have been considered
if Major-General A.E. Grasett had
not suggested that the Canadian
government could be persuaded
to supply the troops. Grasett, as
general officer commanding British
Troops in China, had long argued in
favour of strengthening the garrison
of Hong Kong. Upon his retirement
in August 1941 he had returned to
England via Canada where he had
“long discussions” with his Royal
Military College of Canada classmate
Major-General Harry Crerar, chief of
the general staff (CGS).
The two men had studied the
problems of defending Hong Kong
at the Imperial Defence College in
1934 so there was a wide ranging
and informal discussion of the issues.
The minister of national defence, J.L.
Ralston, joined the conversations
and heard Grasett argue that “two
additional battalions” would render
the garrison strong enough to
withstand, for an extensive period
of siege, an attack by such forces
as the Japanese could bring to bear
against it.10 Grasett also learned much
about the state of the Canadian army
and the concern that recruiting was
suffering because there were no signs
that the Canadians were likely to
become involved in action overseas.
According to Crerar, Grasett did

the year.7

The Australians, who were pressing
Churchill to withdraw their troops
from Tobruk and concentrate their
Middle Eastern divisions under
Australian command, were very
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011

Major-General Arthur Grasett, the
previous commander of British Troops
in Hong Kong and former classmate of
Major-General Harry Crerar, played a
major role in facilitating the despatch
of Canadian troops to Hong Kong.

5
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Two of the principal actors in the
decision to send Canadian troops to
Hong Kong were the minister of national
defence, J.L. Ralston (left) and MajorGeneral H.D.G. Crerar, chief of the
general staff (right). This photograph
was taken on the occasion of the sailing
of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division
to England on 2 August 1941. MajorGeneral C.B. Price (shaking Ralston’s
hand) is the commander of the division
and to the right is Ernest Lapointe,
minister of justice and attorney general.

a very great moral effect in the
whole of the Far East and would
reassure Chiang Kai-Shek as to
reality of our intention to hold
the island.
His Majesty’s Government
in Canada will be well aware
of difficulties we are at present
experiencing in providing forces
which situation in various parts of

not raise the question of Canadian
participation in the defence of Hong
Kong but it is not difficult to see how
he developed the idea.
In London, Grasett presented his
views on the defence of Hong Kong
to the chiefs of staff and suggested
that the needed reinforcements might
come from Canada.11 This idea put
the question in an entirely different
light. Up until then any addition to
the defences of Hong Kong would
have had to come from Malaya and
this was clearly impossible. Canadian
troops, drawn from those based in
Canada not England, would bring
a net addition to Allied strength
in the area. The Americans and
the Chinese would welcome such
concrete evidence of commitment to
the defence of the Far East which the
British themselves were unwilling
to provide.
The chiefs of staff quickly agreed
and sent a memorandum to Churchill
recommending that Canada be asked
to provide a “small reinforcement.”
Churchill still held the view that in

6
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the event of war with Japan, Hong
Kong could not be held or relieved,
but this proposal added credibility to
both deterrence and the prospect of a
prolonged resistance. He accepted the
recommendation with the provision
that “a further decision should be
taken before the battalions actually
sail.”12
A cypher telegram was quickly
dispatched to Ottawa. It read, in part:

the world demands, despite very
great assistance which is being
furnished by the Dominions. We
should therefore be most grateful
if the Canadian Government
would consider whether one or
two Canadian battalions could
be provided from Canada for
this purpose. It is thought that
in view of their special position
in the north Pacific, Canadian
Government would in any case

Position in the Far East now,

have wish to be informed of need

however, changed. Our defences

as we see it for reinforcement of

in Malaya have been improved and

Hong Kong and special value of

there have been signs of a certain

such measure, even though on a

weakening in Japanese attitudes

very limited scale at the present

towards us and the United States.

time. It may also be mentioned that

In these circumstances it is thought

the United States have recently

that a small reinforcement of

despatched a small reinforcement

garrison at Hong Kong e.g. by

to the Philippines. It would be of

one or two more battalions, would

the greatest help if the Canadian

be very fully justified. It would

Government could co-operate

increase strength of garrison out

with us in the manner suggested,

of all proportion to actual numbers

and we much hope they will feel

involved, and it would provide a

free to do so.

strong stimulus to garrison and

If the Canadian Government

Colony; it would further have

agree in principle to send one or

4
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two battalions, we should propose
to communicate with you again
as to best time for their despatch,
having regard to general political
situation in the Far East.
Signed,
The Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs

The wording of this telegram has been
criticized by C.P. Stacey, the official
historian, as wrongly implying
“that the outpost policy had been
abandoned.”13 Brereton Greenhous
is much harsher implying that
“perfidious Albion” was deliberately
deceiving the Canadians. 14 There
is no evidence to support such
an interpretation but the wording
is certainly ambiguous. The key
question is how did the responsible
Canadian decision makers interpret

the request and why did they accept
it?
The minister of national defence
was absent on 19 September and the
telegram was first read by the acting
minister, C.G. “Chubby” Power.
According to Power his immediate
response was positive. “It struck
me as being the only thing to do.”
He contacted the CGS who agreed
that Canada had a “political and
moral obligation” to assist Britain
in the these circumstances. MajorGeneral Crerar then discussed the
proposal with his vice chief, MajorGeneral Ken Stuart and deputy chief,
Major-General Maurice Pope, who
supported Crerar’s assessment.15
The War Cabinet which met on
23 September was also in favour
but Prime Minister Mackenzie King
insisted that the final decision be

deferred until the defence minister
had given his approval. Colonel J.L.
Ralston was a man of extraordinary
ability, widely recognized as the
most powerful figure in the cabinet.
Ralston had commanded a battalion
on the Western Front in the Great
War and was acutely aware of both
the sacrifices the army had made
and the reputation it had won in
that conflict. He had overcome the
hesitations of the prime minister
and the opposition of some of his
colleagues to create a large army
and was determined to see that army
play a major role in the Allied war
effort.16 Ralston could scarcely refuse
an opportunity to employ Canadian
forces in any theatre.
The political case for the
expeditionary force was summed
up by Mr. Justice Duff who formed

LAC PA 149987

Canadian ambassador to China, Major-General Victor Odlum, with Chiang Kai-Shek
and other Chinese officials and dignitaries, 15 March 1944.
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a one man Royal Commission to
investigate the Hong Kong affair.
The evidence discloses various
reasons which appear to have
actuated the War Committee [of
Cabinet]. In view of what the other
Dominions had done in Abyssinia
and Libya it was Canada’s turn to
help; Canada ought to share in the
responsibility for garrisoning the
Pacific area, just as Australia was
assisting Malaya, the military value of
the reinforcement would be out of all
proportion to the numbers involved;
the arrival of the contingent in Hong
Kong would have a great moral effect
in the whole of the Far East and
would reassure the Chinese as to the
British intention to hold Hong Kong,
the moral effect of the expedition
might operate as a sensible influence
for the preservation of peace there;
at that juncture, in September, to
gain time was beyond measure
important; such an appeal from the
predominant partner in the common
cause could not be rejected.17

The political case was clear enough
but what of the responsibility of the
CGS to offer advice about the military
soundness of the decision. Crerar,
as we have seen, knew a good deal
about the problems of defending
Hong Kong from his days at the
Imperial Defence College.18 If he was
persuaded that the addition of two
battalions to the garrison of Hong
Kong would by itself allow the colony
to be defended for a prolonged
period then his military judgment
was certainly wrong. The problem is
that no one could predict what would
happen in the event of war. Would
the Japanese attack Russia? Would
they move south avoiding British
territory? If they attacked in South
Opposite: A Japanese propaganda leaflet
dropped on British (and Canadian)
troops in Hong Kong.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011

East Asia would Hong Kong be an
immediate target? If Hong Kong was
attacked what role would the British
and American fleets play? If Japan
lost the initial battles would Hong
Kong be rapidly reinforced? Who
knew what might happen. In Manila
General Douglas MacArthur was
convinced there would be “no attack
before spring” and was confident
that any Japanese invasion would be
easily repulsed.19 Crerar could not in
fact offer advice about the military
soundness of a proposal, which was
in essence political and strategic.
With the decision made the CGS
turned to the question of which units
should be selected. Crerar’s choice
of the Royal Rifles of Canada and
the Winnipeg Grenadiers has been
subject of much controversy. After the
surrender of Hong Kong questions
about the training and equipment of
Force “C” led to a Royal Commission
which examined the question in
detail. The procedure followed
was that the director of military
training was asked to categorize all
of the infantry battalions in Canada
in terms of their state of training.
The ten most advanced battalions
included the nine allocated to the
4th Canadian Infantry Division (it
had not yet been converted to an
armoured division) and another in
Newfoundland. A second group
were somewhat less advanced and
nine more were in a third category
“due either to recent employment
requiring a period of refresher
training” or insufficient training,
these Category C battalions were
“not recommended for operational
employment at present.”20
Crerar was unwilling to take
battalions from 4th Division and
quickly decided that two of the
Category C battalions which had
recently returned from garrison
duty in Newfoundland and Jamaica
were the best choice. Ralston’s only
complaint was that other battalions
which had not yet been out of Canada

might see this second assignment
overseas as “discrimination against
them.”21
The debate before the Royal
Commission revolved around
charges that battalions were not
fully trained. The Royal Rifles of
Canada were mobilized in 1940 after
amalgamation with the 7/1 Hussars of
the Eastern Townships. A Permanent
Force officer, Lieutenant-Colonel
William James Home, MC, was
selected to command the regiment
which included a large number
of field officers with First World
War experience. Most prominent
was Lieutenant-Colonel John H.
Price, MC, who reverted to the rank
of major and became second-incommand of the battalion. Recruiting
was done selectively throughout
eastern Quebec and New Brunswick
and despite an agreement that only
English speaking volunteers would
be enlisted nearly 40 percent were
bi-lingual Francophones.22
It was not easy to train for
modern war in Canada during 194041. The limited modern equipment
available had been used to outfit the
1st and 2nd Divisions. The Royal
Rifles
had at all times their full share of
rifles and bayonets, an adequate
supply of light machine guns and
pistols and their full scale of transport
vehicles. They had one 2” mortar for
instructional purposes; but with this
exception they had no mortars or
anti-tank rifles.23

Two-inch mortars were made
available, two per company, before
the battalion left for Hong Kong and
two 3-inch inch mortars, the standard
1941 allotment, were issued to the
mortar platoon. Mortar bombs were
unavailable and were to be supplied
from British resources in Hong
Kong.24 The fact that the Canadian
government had not created the
domestic capacity to manufacture

9
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Top left: Soldiers of the Royal Rifles
of Canada wait at the Valcartier train
station to begin their journey to Hong
Kong, 23 October 1941.
Middle left: Soldiers of the Winnipeg
Grenadiers mingle with their families
before entraining for the west coast and
ultimately Hong Kong, 25 October 1941.

LAC PA 116794

LAC PA 116793

Bottom left: Civilian stevedores load
military equipment aboard HMT Awatea
prior to its departure from Vancouver for
Hong Kong, 27 October 1941.
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something as simple as mortar bombs
was not commented upon by the
Royal Commission.
The Royals had been trained by
their own officers and NCOs with
little reference to the Directorate of
Military Training. Garrison duty
in Newfoundland interfered with
advanced training but the battalion
worked at company level exercises
whenever it could. After the battalion
was concentrated at St. John’s in
the spring of 1941 both military
training25 and sports programs were
intensified. The hockey rink, boxing
ring and football field were a crucial
testing ground for soldiers and the
junior NCOs and the vital combat
leaders were usually selected from
the playing field.
The Winnipeg Grenadiers
mobilized as a machine gun battalion
at the outbreak of the war but were
sent to the West Indies in June 1940
as an infantry battalion. For a year
the Grenadiers garrisoned Jamaica
and carried out section and platoon
training. Practice ammunition was
not available so the men learned the
drills but most did not actually fire
their weapons until October 1941
after the battalion had returned to
Winnipeg.26 Neither the Royals nor
the Grenadiers could remotely be
considered “an efficient and well
trained battalion” except by the
standards prevailing in Canada
in 1941 and this was precisely the
argument put forward by the military
before the Royal Commission which
concluded:

8
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Another Chief of the General Staff

of the British Isles in the spring.

in the same circumstances might

Russian resistance is still strong

perhaps not unreasonably have

especially in front of Moscow and

taken another view. But I think the

winter is now near.

balance of practical considerations

... in order to further deter Japan,

favoured the course actually taken.

we are sending forthwith our

There is therefore no good ground

newest battleship Prince of Wales

for imputing to General Crerar, in

to join HMS Repulse in the Indian

the matter of selecting battalions to

Ocean. This is done in spite of

compose the expeditionary force, any

protests of the C in C Home Fleet

error in judgement, much less any

and is a serious risk to run. The

dereliction of duty.27

Prince of Wales will be noticed at
Cape Town quite soon...29

One other matter must be investigated.
When Churchill gave his approval he
had insisted that “a further decision
should be taken before the battalions
actually sail.” According to the
official history, Churchill was asked
for his approval on 2 October and
gave it. Six days later “the Chiefs of
Staff authorized the reinforcement
operation to proceed”28 and shortly
thereafter requested Ottawa to
provide a Brigade Headquarters and
specialist detachments before what
was officially designated as “C” Force
sailed on 22 October.
Neither the British chiefs of staff
nor Churchill reconsidered their
authorization in the light of the
very dramatic changes occurring in
Japan. On 16 October Prince Konoye
resigned as premier and two days
later the army minister General Tojo
formed a new Japanese government.
We now know that the Tojo Cabinet
agreed on a decision to go to war
before the end of 1941 unless the
United States accepted Japanese
terms for peace, but this was not
understood in London or Ottawa.
Churchill’s reaction to the
changed situation was summed up
in a “Most Secret” message to John
Curtin, pPrime minister of Australia,
on 26 October:
I am still inclined to think that
Japan will not run into war…
unless or until Russia is decisively
broken. Perhaps even then they
will wait for the promised invasion

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011

With Churchill now pursuing a policy
of deterrence through symbolic
acts there could be no question of
changing the decision to send Force
“C” to Hong Kong. Indeed, Churchill
had informed the Australians of
the Canadian commitment and
this had greatly encouraged the
government in Canberra. There was
even a suggestion that Canada be
invited to send a brigade to Malaya30
but fortunately there was no time to
act upon it.
The mood in Washington was
somewhat different. On 24 October
the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox
told reporters, “the Japanese have no
intention of giving up their plans for
expansion. If they pursue that course
a collision there is inevitable.”31 The
State Department was unhappy
with Knox’s statement, which was
headline news in Ottawa as well as
New York and Washington. Evidence
from decrypts of Japanese diplomatic
cables now indicated that Japan’s
negotiator in Washington had been
told that he had until 25 November
to obtain an agreement and efforts
to produce a temporary agreement
were underway. 32 This was the
situation when Force “C” arrived
in Honolulu on 2 November. There
is no indication that the Americans
considered intervening to warn the
Canadians of the increased likelihood
of war. Marine detachments from
China were enroute to Manila and
other reinforcements in transit to the

Phillipines from the United States.33
On 14 November the “C” Force convoy
anchored in Manila Bay to rendevous
with HMS Danae, a cruiser which
was to escort “C” Force on the final
leg to Hong Kong. At that moment
Washington was preoccupied with
preparations to meet a new Japanese
envoy, London was absorbed by
Operation “Crusader” which began
on 18 November and Ottawa was out
of the loop.
It is nevertheless evident that if
a re-examination of the decision to
send “C” Force to Hong Kong had
occurred no responsible Canadian
official would have argued for its
cancellation. Great publicity had
been given to the decision to send a
fleet to Singapore34 and preparations
were underway to publicize the
reinforcement of Hong Kong. On
Sunday 16 November, Prime Minister
Mackenzie King announced the
arrival of a Canadian force at Hong
Kong. The text of his statement read:
Defence against aggression actual or
threatened, in any part of the world
is today a part of the defence of every
country which still enjoys freedom.
It is in accordance with this view
that the Government has deemed
it advisable to associate Canadian
troops with those of forces from other
parts of the British Commonwealth
now stationed in the Orient.35

The statement was well received
throughout Canada. The Ottawa
Journal, no friend of the government,
was enthusiastic, informing its readers
“that in the defence of freedom there
can be no such thing as regional
responsibility.”36 The Toronto Star,
which had carried detailed reports
of the deteriorating situation in the
Pacific, suggested Hong Kong “may
prove an island Tobruk. And the
Canadians are proud to be there to
defend it.”37 The Winnipeg Free Press,
with full knowledge that one of the
city’s regiments was there, reported

11
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Canadian troops disembark in Hong
Kong, 16 November 1941.

that the Canadian expeditionary
force was regarded as a “diplomatic
master stroke.” The editor noted
with approval that “more Canadian
troops might be sent to Hong Kong
or other bases in the Pacific.”38 On
25 November the Free Press carried
an op-ed piece on the Canadians
in Hong Kong which was highly
critical of the government for failing
to publicize the arrival of the troops
“as a declaration before the world of
where we stand if it comes to war in
the Pacific.” The Free Press believed
Canadians were starved for news
of their national war effort and the
arrival of “C” Force was a perfect
opportunity to “mobilize all out
support for the war.”39 The second
guessing would not begin until the
announcement of the surrender.
The public now shared the
knowledge that Canadians could
be involved in a war in the Far
East. They were there to deter war
if possible and fight if war came.
When Carl Vincent wrote his oftquoted study of the Canadian role at
Hong Kong he chose to title his book
No Reason Why.40 In fact there were
many reasons why the Canadians

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011

were in Hong Kong. This is clear
when the actions of the Canadian
government and its military advisors
are examined in the context of 1941
without the benefit of hindsight.
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